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Since yesterday, the German Federal Constitutional Court finds itself in an
unusual role: a member state court has referred questions to it about the correct
interpretation of the federal law. It is the Constitutional Court of the Land of
Thuringia, which in this way turns Karlsruhe into a kind of Bundes-ECJ.
The questions referred to the Karlsruhe Court are among the most hotly contested
in German constitutional law of these pandemic times: it is about the Federal
Infection Protection Act and the question of what the parliamentary legislator has
to regulate herself and what she may delegate to the government. For almost the
entire year 2020, until the act was finally amended at the end of November, the
(federal) legislature had tried to make do with a blanket authorisation of (state)
governments to issue ordinances regulating what they considered appropriate in
terms of “necessary protective measures” to ward off the pandemic danger, including
the according encroachments on fundamental rights.
On this basis, the Thuringian government had issued an ordinance at the end of
October 2020, the compatibility of which with the Thuringian constitution must now
be reviewed by the state constitutional court at the request of the far-right AfD. A 9:3
majority considers the ordinance and its statutory basis to be “just about” acceptable
as a transitional measure, as the amendment of the authorising act was already
within reach at the time. However, according to the Thuringian constitutional judges,
their colleagues over in the neighbouring land of Saxony-Anhalt had already come
to the opposite conclusion with respect to their corresponding ordinance, which
they had declared partially unconstitutional. If a Länder constitutional court wishes
to diverge from another in its interpretation of the Grundgesetz, it must obtain a
decision from the Federal Constitutional Court in accordance with Article 100 (3) of
the federal constitution.
Such so-called Divergenzvorlagen are extremely rare. I must confess, I wasn’t aware
that such a thing even existed until yesterday. This fits in with the marginal existence
that the Länder constitutional courts, along with the Länder constitutions, have
generally led since the 1950s. Usually, hardly anyone notices their existence and
their work at all. I have just found out that the Constitutional Court of Saxony-Anhalt
has its seat in the town of Dessau-Roßlau. You never stop learning.
The constitutional law of the Länder is to the Federal Republic what the Grundgesetz
could become to the European Union, at least according to the nightmare that has
been disturbing the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court’s sleep time
and again for the past quarter of a century: academically neglected, practically
insignificant, withering away in the shadow of the superior legal system that is
fertilised and watered by a powerful and self-confident court and sends its normative
vines through almost all areas of life, society and politics with its many-branched
fundamental rights jurisprudence, robbing everything growing below of light and air.
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Might this be starting to change now? Is something like a federal
Verfassungsgerichtsverbund emerging? Are the state constitutional courts beginning
to discover that referrals to Karlsruhe might raise their status, turn them into
interlocutors and cue-givers for the further development of constitutional law in
the European multi-level system? Might other state constitutional courts perhaps
choose to defiantly wave the flag of their constitutional identity and fend off Karlsruhe
encroachments? With its verdict of unconstitutionality, the Saxony-Anhalt court
had itself diverged from a previous ruling from Thuringia and, according to the logic
of its Thuringian colleagues, would thus possibly itself have been obliged to refer
questions to Karlsruhe accordingly. But it didn’t. A statement, perhaps?
Effective legal protection
As far as the ECJ is concerned, it has more urgent things to do right now than
waltzing with the German Constitutional Court in mutual Verfassungsgerichtsverbund
embrace. The Polish “Constitutional Tribunal” (its blatantly illegal composition
forbids its mention under its erstwhile name without quotation marks), as far as the
transformation of the Polish judiciary into an authoritarian tool of the PiS party is
concerned, is setting out to defect from its allegiance to EU law and the European
Court of Justice altogether, allegedly in the name of Polish constitutional identity.
In one of the cases currently pending before the ECJ, Advocate General Bobek
presented his opinion yesterday: A criminal chamber at the District Court in
Warsaw had referred questions to the ECJ about the fact that in Poland the public
prosecutor’s office is empowered to assign judges to a higher court and to remove
them again without being accountable to anyone for the criteria nor for the timing at
which it chooses to do so. The Chief Prosecutor is, of course, the same person that
holds the office of Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro, the dark lord of PiS legal and
judicial policy since 2015.
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++
Ausschreibung für eine Promotionsstelle
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Promotionsstelle (E 13, 100%, drei Jahre mit Verlängerungsmöglichkeit) an
der Professur für Europarecht, Prof. Dr. Anna Katharina Mangold, LL.M.
(Cambridge), Europa-Universität Flensburg.
Forschungsschwerpunkte an der Professur sind neben allen Fragen des deutschen
öffentlichen Rechts und Europarechts insbesondere Antidiskriminierungsrecht,
rechtliche Regelungen zur Corona-Pandemie, öffentliche Rechtsgeschichte und
interdisziplinäre Rechtsforschung. Bewerbungsfrist ist der 4.6.2021.
Mehr Informationen gibt es hier.
++++++++++++++++++++++
Is this a problem that can be fixed at all under European law? Article 19 TEU
requires “effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. Judicial
policy is reserved to the member states, but insofar as courts also rule on Union
law, their independence is an EU issue as well. That, in fact, applies pretty much
to all courts in Europe. Does this mean that every single fair trial and lawful judge
issue anywhere opens an extraordinary appeal path to Luxembourg? What kind
of normative vines could sprout from such a seed and eventually overgrow the
sovereignty of the member states to shape their judiciary according to their own
ideas?
Not to worry, says Advocate General Bobek: Article 19 TEU grants an “extraordinary
remedy for extraordinary cases”. As far as this norm is concerned, whether the
judiciary in a member state is independent or not is not a case-to-case matter. It
is “structural”. And the EU as a community of law as a whole depends on it. “In
a system such as that of the European Union, where the law is the main vehicle
for achieving integration, the existence of an independent judicial system (both
centrally and nationally), capable of ensuring the correct application of that law, is of
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paramount importance. Quite simply, without an independent judiciary, there would
no longer be a genuine legal system. If there is no ‘law’, there can hardly be more
integration. The aspiration of creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe’ is destined to collapse if legal black holes begin to appear on the judicial
map of Europe.”
Article 19 TEU is not about judicial micromanagement, but about “whether a Member
State’s judicial system complies with the principle of the rule of law, one of the
Union’s founding values, which is also to be found in Article 2 TEU.” Only when the
problems assume such a gravity and/or such a systemic nature that they can no
longer be dealt with in the internal legal system does the way to Luxembourg open
up.
With this, the Advocate General, it seems to me, ends up not too far away from the
proposal that Armin von Bogdandy and his Heidelberg research group developed
almost a decade ago in an expert opinion for the German Foreign Office and put
up for discussion in a legendary online symposium here on Verfassungsblog: a
kind of reversed Solange reservation of the ECJ vis-à-vis the member states, as
far as fundamental judicial procedural rights are concerned. As long as (solange)
these rights are respected on the whole, failures in individual cases remain none
of Luxembourg’s business. But if the whole starts to slip, then the ECJ is in charge
and may and will do what is necessary to save the community of law from internal
disintegration.
Which, of course, is clearly the case with Poland.
(Meanwhile, the Polish Minister of Education, Przemys#aw Czarnek, announces that
in future Polish students will learn in school that the European Union is an “illegal
entity”…).
The week on Verfassungsblog
Speaking of Verfassungsgerichtsverbund: last year, the Federal Constitutional Court,
with its Weiss ruling, accused the ECJ and the European Central Bank of an ultra
vires act, a huge act of escalation in the Karlsruhe/Luxembourg conflict. This week,
however, the Second Senate explained that its expectations of conduct in conformity
with the Treaty were in fact a lot easier to fulfil than many would have thought.
MARTIN NETTESHEIM analyses what this implies.
A constitutional sensation took place in Kenya last week. In a ruling of over 300
pages, the country’s High Court adopted the so-called basic structure doctrine for
Kenyan constitutional law. According to this doctrine, the core content of the Kenyan
Constitution cannot be changed by the ordinary legislator, but only by the people as
the primary constituent power. YANIV ROZNAI explains why the ruling is a milestone
and will have far-reaching consequences beyond Kenya.
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In Scotland, the elections have produced a majority in parliament in favour of
independence. KELLY SHUTTLEWORTH analyses how Scotland could find its way
back into the EU in this event.
Almost four years ago, the Catalan government tried to force independence from
Spain with a unilateral “referendum”. Many of those responsible were sentenced
to draconian prison terms by the Spanish judiciary, and Spain’s Constitutional
Court gave its blessing last month. JOAQUÍN URÍAS analyses how this may affect
freedom of assembly.
European asylum law is plagued by several structural problems. It relies on highly
complicated procedures laid down in lengthy regulations, many of which do not
function in legal practice at Europe’s external borders. DANIEL THYM explains the
human rights limits for pushbacks.
In Brazil, Attorney General Augusto Aras has filed a lawsuit against law professor
Conrado Hübner Mendes after the academic criticised him in a newspaper article.
EMILIO PELUSO NEDER MEYER and THOMAS DA ROSA DE BUSTAMANTE see
this as a sign of how much academic freedom is under attack in Brazil.
Recently, lèse-majesté laws have been used as a weapon against the opposition
in Turkey, Spain and Poland. Their very existence threatens the right to freedom of
expression. AYTEKIN KAAN KURTUL thinks modern democracies should urgently
abolish this relic of a bygone era.
After a long wait, the British government has unveiled its ‘Online Safety Bill‘, which
is supposed to usher in a new era of accountability for platform operators. The only
problem, according to EDINA HARBINJA, is that the bill in its current form potentially
violates human rights and may even encourage private censorship.
Britain has recently declared itself the “Nation of Animal Lovers”. The government
has presented an action plan for the protection of animals, which includes
recognising animals as sentient beings. If one believes the accompanying
government rhetoric, this has only become possible because of Brexit. KATHARINA
BRAUN explains that things are not quite like that and that the government must now
back up its words with action if it is serious about animal welfare.
In China, the government is taking stronger action against giants of the digital
economy whose market behaviour is monopolistic or anti-competitive and thus
harms national innovation strategies. SHUNYU CHI examines the record $2.75
billion fine against Alibaba, a powerhouse of the Chinese economy, in this context.
The debate on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s climate decision
continues: It has brought the issue of intergenerational justice back into the
spotlight of political and legal discussions. LUKAS MÄRTIN and CARL MÜHLBACH
argue that a departure from budgetary austerity (Schwarze Null) must now follow.
Future freedom can only be had with a massive expansion of investment. ARMIN
STEINBACH takes a more critical look at the verdict, fearing that euphoria could
soon turn into disillusionment: At least from a global perspective, the Federal
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Constitutional Court is paying for its legal innovations with economic naivety,
because the decision now gives other states an incentive to consume even
more CO2. MARTEN BREUER, on the other hand, ponders what unforeseeable
consequences the decision could have for the dogmatics of fundamental rights of
freedom.
German parties, like the FDP recently, are holding their party conventions online
in the pandemic. Is this a token of digital progress? At any rate, according to
ALEXANDER HOBUSCH, it is a step backwards as far as internal democracy of
parties is concerned.
In India, a conflict has arisen between Delhi and the federal level, with the
preliminary result of Delhi’s democratically legitimised self-government being
considerably curtailed. EKLAVYYA VASUDEV explains the background to the
conflict, arguing that a methodologically flawed Supreme Court ruling sowed the
seeds for Delhi’s disempowerment.
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++
Making outstanding research visible – this could be your ADVERTISEMENT!
If you want to draw attention to a conference, a job offer, a CfP or a book release,
you can do so on Verfassungsblog. Our weekly editorial is sent out to more than
11,000 constitutionalists world-wide!




So much for this week. Please don’t forget: We remain dependent on your support!
All the best,
Max Steinbeis
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